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NOTES 
YOU MUST BE THIS QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN 
OPINION:  PERMITTING LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS TO TESTIFY AS LAYPERSONS UNDER 
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 701 
Kim Channick* 
 
Every day, in courtrooms across the United States, law enforcement 
officers testify in criminal and civil trials.  Often an officer is certified as an 
expert witness and, accordingly, can provide opinions to the court based on 
his or her law enforcement expertise.  Other times, the officer offers 
testimony as a layperson.  In the latter situation, Federal Rule of Evidence 
701 controls the officer’s lay opinion testimony.  This Rule was first 
adopted to remedy a problematic common law practice of universally 
prohibiting lay opinion testimony.  As the Rule stands now, all lay 
witnesses, including law enforcement officers, must limit their opinions to 
ones that are based on their personal perceptions and that are helpful to the 
fact-finder. 
Courts, however, are split regarding where to draw the line when lay 
officers are asked to provide lay opinion testimony about an investigation.  
In particular, courts have disagreed over the question of when a lay officer 
may provide opinion testimony about the meaning of recorded phone calls.  
This Note explores the three approaches the federal circuit courts take to 
this question.  To resolve the split, this Note suggests that an amended 
version of the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits’ approaches be adopted.  
These circuits hold that officers’ lay opinion testimony must be restricted to 
instances of true first-hand knowledge to ensure that jurors are not 
prejudiced by unqualified and unhelpful testimony. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We have all recounted hilarious or dramatic events that fell flat as stories.  
Sometimes “you had to be there,”1 and the retelling does not quite capture 
the moment.  Indeed, many life experiences can be difficult to fully recreate 
 
 1. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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solely with words.  Yet we often ask witnesses to do just that:  use facts 
alone to convey complex scenarios and experiences. 
In our system, the jury or the judge, sitting as fact-finder, decides 
questions of fact.2  To assist in the proper determination of disputed facts, 
plaintiffs and defendants provide the fact-finder with concrete evidence.  
Simultaneously, courts police this evidence, enforcing procedural and 
evidentiary rules that act to maintain fair and nonprejudicial trials.  Witness 
testimony is one main way that the fact-finder obtains information about the 
situation in question.  Although witnesses are generally required to speak in 
terms of facts,3 the reality that sometimes “you had to be there” often means 
that witnesses are unable to provide an explanation of a situation with facts 
alone.  Thus, under the right circumstances, witnesses—both lay and 
expert—are permitted to provide opinions or make inferential statements 
that will enable the witness to paint the most accurate possible picture of the 
situation.4 
While in some instances allowing lay witnesses to offer opinions will 
better convey the “whole story,” this practice can also raise concerns about 
invading the province of the jury5 or opening the door to otherwise 
inadmissible evidence.6  Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which dictates the 
admissibility of lay opinion testimony, limits the circumstances when 
laypersons may offer opinions in order to avoid exactly these types of 
concerns.7  Under Rule 701, lay opinion testimony must be (a) “rationally 
based on the witness’s perception,” (b) “helpful to clearly understanding the 
witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue,” and (c) “not based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of 
Rule 702.”8  While some lay opinion testimony will unquestionably satisfy 
these requirements, other testimony presents harder questions of 
admissibility, testing the boundaries of the Rule. 
This Note will explore the issues that Rule 701 raises by examining how 
opinion testimony restrictions are applied to the testimony of law 
enforcement officers in criminal cases.  In these cases, law enforcement 
officers may possess knowledge of the various investigation methods that 
were used, the people involved, and the essential timeline of the 
investigation process.  Frequently, testimony about these matters is relevant 
 
 2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 671 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “fact-finder” as “[o]ne or 
more persons—such as jurors in a trial or administrative-law judges in a hearing—who hear 
testimony and review evidence to rule on a factual issue”). 
 3. See 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 11, at 56 (6th ed. 2006). 
 4. See FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 5. See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 6253, at 109–10 (1997). 
 6. See United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the 
appellant argued that the lay opinion testimony allowed the prosecution to admit otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay); Mary Morton, Note, The Hearsay Rule and Epistemological Suicide, 
74 GEO. L.J. 1301, 1305 (1986) (arguing that the lay opinion rule makes it impossible to ban 
all hearsay). 
 7. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (1975 adoption). 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
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and admissible as based on personal perception.  Questions begin to arise, 
however, when law enforcement officers are asked to testify beyond the 
strict boundaries of their personal perception to help the fact-finder 
overcome that “you had to be there” feeling. 
At times, such officers are certified as experts under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 and may provide opinion testimony based on both experience 
with the case in question and knowledge obtained in the course of their law 
enforcement career.9  In other situations, law enforcement officers are not 
qualified as experts but are permitted to offer lay opinion testimony under 
Rule 701.10  The reasons for eliciting lay opinion testimony, rather than 
qualifying the officer as an expert, vary.  Sometimes the officer cannot meet 
the requirements of Rule 702, which were established in the seminal case 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.11  In other cases, it may be 
more efficient to use lay opinion. 
Whatever the reason, the decision to offer lay opinion testimony of law 
enforcement officers gives rise to several vexing and recurring questions.  
When does a law enforcement lay witness possess enough personal 
knowledge to provide opinions about various aspects of a case?  What kind 
of testimony do we want the jury to hear from these witnesses?  The 
purpose of testimony is to provide the fact-finder with information that is 
helpful to deciding the facts of the case.  Does allowing a law enforcement 
officer who has investigated a case to provide his opinion about certain 
pieces of evidence or the case as a whole accomplish this goal or merely 
substitute the jury’s assessment of the evidence with the law enforcement 
officer’s assessment? 
This Note addresses the three-way circuit split regarding whether lay 
opinion testimony is admissible under Rule 701 for law enforcement 
officers who testify regarding an investigation of which they only have 
general and often after-the-fact knowledge. 
 
 9. Rule 702 reads as follows: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 
the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Brian R. Gallini, To Serve and Protect?  Officers As Expert 
Witnesses in Federal Drug Prosecutions, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 373 (2012) 
(describing the application of Rule 702 to a law enforcement officer testifying as an expert 
regarding code words in a drug transaction); Anne Bowen Poulin, Experience-Based 
Opinion Testimony:  Strengthening the Lay Opinion Rule, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 551, 554 (2012) 
(“Law enforcement officers are routinely permitted to testify as experts based on their law 
enforcement experience.”). 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1102 (11th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213, 1221–22 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 11. 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993). 
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The cases analyzed in this Note consider this question by examining Rule 
701(a), Rule 701(b), or, in some instances, both.  Courts that focus on Rule 
701(a)’s requirement that lay opinion testimony be “rationally based on the 
witness’s perception,”12 consider the nature of the witness’s relationship 
with the situation in question.13  These courts discuss, either directly or 
indirectly, whether the witness’s personal experience with the evidence 
rises to the level of “first-hand knowledge or observation.”14  Courts that 
instead focus on Rule 701(b)’s requirement that lay opinion testimony be 
“helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining 
a fact in issue,”15 consider whether the witness’s supposed personal 
knowledge contributes any useful information to the jury’s understanding of 
the case.16  While circuit courts discuss the issue in different ways, the 
underlying inquiry is the same.  Courts ask whether the lay witness’s 
knowledge of the situation enhances the fact-finder’s ability to properly 
decide the case. 
Part I of this Note will provide background information about Rule 701.  
This includes a discussion of the Rule’s common law origins, the adoption 
of the Rule, the meaning of the Rule’s three requirements, and the Rule’s 
real-world applications.  Part II will explain the conflict among the circuits 
regarding nonexpert law enforcement officers providing opinion testimony 
about investigations.  Finally, Part III will argue that, while the jury should 
have access to the information it needs to make an accurate decision, this 
information should be meaningfully limited to exclude unqualified and 
unhelpful testimony that invades the province of the jury. 
 
 12. FED. R. EVID. 701(a). 
 13. See, e.g., Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103; United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292–
93 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 831–32 (7th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 902, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Garcia, 
413 F.3d 201, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir. 
2001). 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note.  Courts often disfavor the use of 
legislative history for a variety of reasons. See Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal 
Rules of Evidence:  The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1283, 1284–87 (1995).  However, some scholars have suggested that the Advisory 
Committee notes for the Federal Rules of Evidence do not have the same problems as other 
forms of legislative history and, therefore, should be given considerable weight. See Edward 
W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 913 
(1978) (“[The Advisory Committee notes] must be taken to represent the thinking of 
[Congress] as the equivalent of a committee report effectively serving as the basis of 
legislation.”); Scallen, supra, at 1287–93 (discussing the “[s]pecial [q]uality of the Advisory 
Committee and [i]ts [n]otes”).  Many courts interpreting Rule 701 seem to agree with this 
assessment, as several of the cases analyzed in this Note make specific reference to Rule 
701’s Advisory Committee note. See, e.g., Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1120–21; Garcia, 413 F.3d 
at 211; Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641 n.3.  These continued references to the Advisory Committee 
note suggest that courts agree with and follow the Advisory Committee’s interpretation of 
Rule 701. 
 15. FED. R. EVID. 701(a). 
 16. See, e.g., Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103; United States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213, 
1221–22 (10th Cir. 2007); Garcia, 413 F.3d at 210. 
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I.  FROM COMMON LAW TO RULE 701:  THE EVOLUTION OF 
LAY OPINION TESTIMONY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Part I of this Note outlines the evolution of lay testimony in the American 
court system.  Part I.A focuses on the common law’s dismissal of lay 
opinion testimony, as well as the problems the common law approach 
created.  Part I.B examines the rejection of the common law approach and 
the adoption of Rule 701.  Part I.C analyzes the three provisions of Rule 
701, highlighting how the Rule is commonly interpreted.  Part I.D. 
addresses the critiques of Rule 701 and the responses to these critiques.  
Finally, Part I.E provides an overview of the most common uses of Rule 
701. 
A.  Common Law Lay Testimony 
Under Rule 701, lay witnesses—witnesses not qualified as experts—are 
allowed to offer opinion or inferential testimony when they possess certain 
personal knowledge of the situation in question and when the nature of the 
testimony is such that opinions or inferences provide something of value to 
the trier of fact.17 
However, at common law, lay testimony differed significantly from the 
admissible lay testimony of today.18  Despite providing the origins for the 
American opinion rule, British courts were markedly less restrictive of 
opinion testimony than their American counterparts, allowing lay witnesses 
to offer opinions that were based on personal knowledge.19  Conversely, at 
common law, the American court system did not permit lay witnesses to 
provide opinions.20  Instead, laypersons were allowed to relate only facts, or 
as one judge explained, state that which “they had seen, heard, felt, smelled, 
tasted, or done.”21  This restrictive approach to lay testimony stemmed from 
 
 17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1741 (defining “lay witness” as “[a] 
witness who does not testify as an expert and who is therefore restricted to giving an opinion 
or making an inference that (1) is based on firsthand knowledge, and (2) is helpful in 
clarifying the testimony or in determining facts”). 
 18. See Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195–99 (3d Cir. 
1995) (providing a general history of the evolution of lay opinion testimony and explaining 
that Rule 701 demonstrates “a movement away from the courts’ historically skeptical view 
of lay opinion evidence”). 
 19. See 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 51–52; Herman Edgar Garner, Jr., Comment, 
Opinion and Expert Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 36 LA. L. REV. 123, 124 (1975). 
 20. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 618 (1884) (explaining that 
impression and opinion testimony of nonexpert witnesses regarding sanity are inadmissible, 
even where the witness provides rationales for the statements); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A 
DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 141 n.1 (George Chase ed., 2d ed. 1912) (“It is a general 
rule that witnesses must give evidence of facts, not of opinions.”); see also Asplundh Mfg. 
Div., 57 F.3d at 1195 (noting that common law lay witnesses were not allowed to “draw 
conclusions which could be characterized as opinion testimony”); Charles R. Richey, 
Proposals To Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word “Expert” Under the 
Federal Rules Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 542 (1994). 
 21. Richey, supra note 20, at 542; see also Asplundh Mfg. Div., 57 F.3d at 1195 (quoting 
Judge Richey’s explanation of lay opinion testimony at common law). 
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a general skepticism toward the reliability of laypersons’ opinions,22 as well 
as a belief that it was the jury’s job to form opinions, not the witnesses’.23 
Further, the common law lay testimony rule relied on the misguided 
principle that facts and opinions are “readily distinguishable.”24  In practice, 
however, this distinction is not easily made,25 as any recollection of facts is 
in some way “the product of inference as well as observation and 
memory.”26  The following is an example of the way in which even 
seemingly factual testimony is actually full of inferential and opinion-based 
statements: 
A jury trial.  A witness, on direct examination, is describing an 
automobile accident: 
Q. What happened then? 
A. The lady in the car that got hit stumbled out of her car and fell in a 
faint. 
Defense counsel:  Move to strike the opinions of the witness.  Let him 
state the facts. 
 
 22. See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 212 (1926) (“[T]he judge is 
to give an absolute sentence, and therefore ought to have more sure ground than thinking.” 
(quoting Adams v. Canon, (1622) 73 Eng. Rep. 117 (K.B.) 118 n.15) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Richey, supra note 20, at 542; see also Asplundh Mfg. Div., 57 F.3d at 
1195. 
 23. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON 
LAW 524 (1898). 
 24. 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 53 (arguing that the “basic assumption” behind the 
distinction between fact and opinion “is an illusion”); see also 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET 
AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 701.02, at 701-4 (10th ed. 2011) (discussing 
“[t]he [v]ague [d]istinction [b]etween [o]pinion and [f]act”); 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A 
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 1919, at 112 (2d ed. 1923) (arguing that when it comes to distinguishing facts from opinion 
“no such distinction is scientifically possible”).  Famous evidence scholar John Henry 
Wigmore was quite vocal in his general distaste for the common law opinion rule, asserting 
that the rule was “developed with a[] . . . peculiar rigidity and stolid disregard of practical 
consequences.” Id. § 1929, at 123.  Moreover, Wigmore prophesized that “the [o]pinion rule 
will in substance disappear.” Id. § 1929, at 124.  Judge Learned Hand shared Wigmore’s 
disapproval of the opinion rule, calling it “the most annoying rule in its application that I 
know.” Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials To Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 
3 LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 89, 98 (1926). 
 25. See FED R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (“[T]he practical impossibility of 
determinating by rule what is a ‘fact,’ demonstrated by a century of litigation of the question 
of what is a fact for purposes of pleading under the Field Code, extends into evidence 
also.”); H. Patrick Furman, Opinion Testimony:  Lay, Expert, or Something Else?, 37 COLO. 
LAW. 33, 33 (2008) (discussing the problem of distinguishing “fact” from “opinion”). 
 26. 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 53; see also WILLARD L. KING & DOUGLASS 
PILLINGER, A STUDY OF THE LAW OF OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 8 (1942) (“The American 
courts have had a great struggle with a rule which appeared to require them to admit 
statements of fact and exclude all inferences of the witness.  Such a rule is quite impossible 
of application:  all statements contain inferences.”); JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE:  
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 24 (1947) (concluding that, at least in part, all 
“assertions are opinions”); THAYER, supra note 23, at 524 (“In a sense all testimony to matter 
of fact is opinion evidence; i. e., it is a conclusion formed from phenomena and mental 
impressions.”). 
 3446 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
The Court:  Strike them out.  The jury will disregard that answer.  [To the 
witness:]  You must state the facts and not your conclusions regarding 
them.  You can’t give the jury your opinion as to which car got hit, whose 
car it was, how the lady got out of the car or why she fell, if she did 
fall,—you must state the facts.27 
Judge Learned Hand provided a famous and eloquent criticism of the 
common law lay opinion rule, stating that “[t]he line between opinion and 
fact is at best only one of degree.”28 
The impossibility of definitively distinguishing facts from opinions 
created two main problems for common law lay testimony.  First, when 
relating factual situations, witnesses struggled to omit all opinion-based or 
inferential language, as this type of language naturally permeates witnesses’ 
efforts to provide a detailed description of a situation.29  Accordingly, lay 
witnesses often unwittingly overstepped the line between fact and opinion, 
making the process of lay witnesses testifying an exceedingly difficult 
one.30 
A lay witness who is asked to explain how an individual reacted to a 
situation would most naturally respond that the individual was mad, sad, 
happy, etc.  Under the common law rule, however, a witness was not 
allowed to state the emotion he or she reasonably inferred the individual to 
be experiencing.31  Instead, the witness would need to provide a list of 
physical characteristics to demonstrate the individual’s emotions.32  For 
example, instead of testifying that a person appeared angry, common law 
lay witnesses were required to state that person had a furrowed brow or a 
red face.33 
Second, the common law lay testimony rule also created the problem of 
endless litigation over the question of whether testimony constituted fact or 
 
 27. KING & PILLINGER, supra note 26, at 1. 
 28. Cent. R. Co. of N.J. v. Monahan, 11 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1926); see also Beech 
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988) (repeating Judge Hand’s remark 
regarding the difference between facts and opinions). 
 29. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (emphasizing the struggle 
witnesses experienced when attempting to speak without any opinions or inferences); United 
States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that often it is difficult for 
witnesses “to describe the appearance or relationship of persons, the atmosphere of a place, 
or the value of an object by reference only to objective facts”). 
 30. See Cent. R. Co., 11 F.2d at 214 (observing that “the witness cannot comply [with 
the common law lay witness rule], since, like most men, he is unaware of the extent to which 
inference enters into his perceptions”); Hand, supra note 24, at 97–98 (1926) (“I know of [no 
rule] more baffling to a witness, who has been accustomed to proceed exactly in that fashion 
in proving his points outside of court.”); see also Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor 
Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Judge Hand’s criticism regarding the 
unnecessary difficulty the common law lay witness rule placed on witnesses). 
 31. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1917, at 101 (explaining that, at common law, 
judges frequently would say to a witness “we want what you know, not what you think or 
believe” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 32. 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24, § 701.02, at 701-5. 
 33. See id. 
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opinion,34 a distinction that proved impossible to determine consistently.35  
Wigmore explained that the attempt to distinguish facts from opinions did 
“more than any one rule of procedure to reduce our litigation towards a 
state of legalized gambling.”36 
Despite the procedural problems that the common law rule created, 
courts were slow to abandon the strict opinion-fact distinction.37  Initially 
the rule was only relaxed in extreme cases of necessity.38  Over time, 
however, concerns about the functionality of the lay witness rule 
increased.39  Additionally, the American court system experienced a 
“general liberalization” of all evidentiary rules that acted to keep evidence 
from the fact-finder.40 
B.  The Adoption of Rule 701 
In 1975, given the problems experienced under the common law opinion 
rule, Rule 701 was adopted.41  The adoption of Rule 701, however, did not 
represent a sudden shift in preference from factual testimony to opinion 
testimony.  Even under Rule 701, witnesses are still encouraged to provide 
testimony in the form of facts as often as possible.42  The continued 
 
 34. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (addressing the century spent 
litigating the difference between facts and opinions); Asplundh Mfg. Div., 57 F.3d at 1195 
(noting the “numerous appeals” that resulted from the strict fact-opinion distinction); 
2 EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 195–96 (1954) (stating that the bar 
on lay opinion testimony resulted in “many foolish reversals and still more foolish appeals”). 
 35. See 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7:1, 
at 748 (3d ed. 2007) (describing the inadmissibility of lay opinion testimony as a 
“mischievous . . . instrument of review”); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1929, at 124 (arguing 
that the common law opinion rule was in part problematic because of “the utter impossibility 
of a consistent application of the rule, and the consequent uncertainty of the law”). 
 36. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1929, at 124. 
 37. See 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 53. 
 38. See Grismore v. Consol. Prods. Co., 5 N.W.2d 646, 655 (Iowa 1942) (finding that 
opinions are admissible in the case of necessity); Balt. & O. R. Co. v. Schultz, 1 N.E. 324, 
332 (Ohio 1885) (finding that lay witnesses may give opinions only where the opinion is 
“necessary to the due administration of justice” and provides material information about the 
issue in question); Graham v. Pa. Co., 21 A. 151, 153 (Pa. 1891) (concluding that, where 
facts are sufficient to describe a situation, opinions will be inadmissible); 2 MORGAN, supra 
note 34, at 191 (using Rule 401 of the American Law Institute’s Model Code—which states 
that a witness may not offer opinion if “the witness can readily and with equal accuracy and 
adequacy communicate what he has perceived to the trier of fact without testifying in terms 
of inferences or stating inferences”—to demonstrate the then-current state of opinion 
testimony); see also 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 53–54. 
 39. See Asplundh Mfg. Div., 57 F.3d at 1195. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL 
STUDENT EDITION § 10.02[1], at 10-9 (9th ed. 2011); D. Garrison Hill, Lay Witness 
Opinions, 19 S.C. LAW. 34, 36 (2007) (“With the adoption of the Federal Rule of Evidence 
701 in 1972, the federal courts retreated from their longstanding hostility towards lay 
opinion evidence.”). 
 42. See 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 56; 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, 
§ 7:2, at 749 (arguing that the conditions put on lay testimony under Rule 701 represent “a 
mild rule of preference” that usually lay witnesses should testify with facts and not opinions 
or inferences). 
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emphasis on facts over opinions reflects the ultimate goal of all evidence, 
which is to provide the fact-finder with the best information and details 
upon which an independent opinion can be formed.43 
When Rule 701 was initially adopted in 1975 it contained the following 
language: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are 
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a 
clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue.44 
Soon after the Rule was adopted, the desirability of refinement became 
evident.  Following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, both lay 
witnesses, under Rule 701,45 and expert witnesses, under Rule 702,46 were 
permitted to give opinions.47  This eliminated the fundamental advantage of 
offering a witness as an expert.48  Moreover, under the original version of 
Rule 701, attorneys often had significant discretion to determine whether to 
offer an experienced witness as an expert or as a layperson,49 as some 
courts allowed opinion testimony “based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge”50 under Rule 701, viewing the distinction between 
Rule 701 and Rule 702 with general indifference.51 
At times, lawyers chose to admit a witness as a layperson in order to 
avoid special procedural barriers placed on expert witnesses.52  Laypersons 
were not required to go through “expert-discovery obligations” and, further, 
did not experience the same scrutiny of their reliability that judges often 
inflicted upon expert witnesses.53 
 
 43. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (“The rule retains the traditional 
objective of putting the trier of fact in possession of an accurate reproduction of the event.”); 
1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 56; 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 7:1, at 747, 
§ 7.2, at 749–50; Garner, supra note 19, at 123 (highlighting the strong emphasis the 
American court system has placed on providing the fact-finder with the “best evidence 
possible” to determine an issue). 
 44. FED. R. EVID. 701 (1975) (subsequently amended). 
 45. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 46. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 47. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 502 (3d ed. 2012). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 501. 
 50. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 51. See, e.g., Greenwood Ranches, Inc. v. Skie Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 
1980) (allowing ranch operator-owner to testify as a lay witness to the value of crops); S. 
Cent. Livestock Dealers, Inc. v. Sec. State Bank of Hedley, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061–62 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (permitting the financial officer for a feedlot to testify about the value of the 
feedlot’s assets and liabilities as a layman under Rule 701 and as an expert under Rule 702); 
see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 47, at 503; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 41, 
§ 10.02[2][c], at 10-14. 
 52. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 47, at 502. 
 53. Id. 
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However, two important Supreme Court cases in the 1990s, Daubert54 
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael55 increased the standards for expert 
testimony, requiring that the reliability of an expert’s methods be tested 
prior to admission.56  Accordingly, in 2000, the language of Rule 701 and 
Rule 702 was amended, both to codify the standards that the Supreme Court 
set for expert testimony57 and to prevent “proffering an expert in lay 
witness clothing.”58 
Under the new Rules, parties should not be able to avoid either the 
reliability requirements of Rule 70259 or “the expert witness pretrial 
disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.”60 
C.  Interpreting the Provisions of Rule 701 
This part explores the three provisions of Rule 701, explaining how each 
plays a part in the functioning of the Rule and the restricting of lay opinion 
testimony.  This part highlights both the interpretations of Rule 701 that 
enjoy general acceptance, as well the interpretations that have received a 
mixed reception. 
The current version of Rule 701 reads as follows: 
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an 
opinion is limited to one that is: 
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; 
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to 
determine a fact in issue; and 
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
within the scope of Rule 702.61 
Notably, while the sections below attempt to explain the meaning of each 
prong of Rule 701, the Rule provides judges with significant discretion to 
determine what constitutes admissible lay opinion testimony.62 
 
 54. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 55. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 56. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert 
Testimony:  A Partial Answer to the Questions Left Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 52 ME. L. REV. 19, 20–23 (2000); Poulin, supra note 9, at 558–59. 
 57. See Poulin, supra note 9, at 559. 
 58. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment). 
 59. Id.; see also 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE:  COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
§ 701.03[4][b], at 701-31 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2013) (explaining that the 
reliability requirement of Rule 702 stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert). 
 60. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[4][b], at 701-31 (citing FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26; FED. R. CRIM. P. 16). 
 61. FED. R. EVID. 701.  This version of Rule 701 also reflects amendments that were 
made to the Rule in 2011.  However, the changes made to the Rule in 2011 were purely 
stylistic in nature and were not intended to have any effect on the practical application of the 
Rule. See id. advisory committee’s note (2011 amendment). 
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1.  Rule 701(a) and the Requirement That Testimony Be Rationally 
Based on the Witness’s Perception 
In analyzing the meaning of Rule 701(a), it is more accurate to separate 
the provision into two distinct requirements.63  First, 701(a) requires that 
lay opinion testimony be based on the “witness’s perception.”64  Second, 
the witness’s testimony must be “rationally based” on this perception.65 
Rule 701’s Advisory Committee note characterizes a “witness’s 
perception” as “the familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or 
observation.”66  The requirement that a witness testify based on first-hand 
knowledge, otherwise referred to as personal knowledge, is not unique to 
Rule 701 and, in fact, finds its origins in medieval law.67  Moreover, 
personal knowledge also appears in Rule 602, which requires that all 
layperson testimony, whether expressing an opinion or not, be founded in 
personal knowledge.68 
The emphasis on personal knowledge stems from “the law’s usual 
preference that decisions be based on the best evidence available.”69  Some 
distortion occurs each time the events of an incident are retold; thus making 
testimony directly from the person who perceived the incident the most 
reliable version.70  Moreover, where a layperson is offering an opinion, 
courts want to be sure that the individual rests his assertion upon a 
“competent foundation.”71 
What it means to possess “first-hand knowledge” of something is not 
entirely clear.  Indeed, this question lies at the heart of this Note’s inquiry.72  
However, despite the difficulty of determining the outer bounds of first-
 
 62. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6253, at 116 (“By leaving the concepts of 
opinion and inference undefined, the drafters bestowed upon the courts considerable 
discretion to determine the scope of Rule 701.”). 
 63. See Poulin, supra note 9, at 560 (explaining that Rule 701 can be divided into “four 
hurdles”). 
 64. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. advisory committee’s note. 
 67. See 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 52 (“The early courts demanded that witnesses 
speak only ‘what they see and hear.’”). 
 68. FED. R. EVID. 602.  (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced 
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.  
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.  This 
rule does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.”); see also 3 MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 7:2, at 750, § 7:3, at 751. 
 69. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 602.02[1], at 602-3; see also 1 BROUN, 
supra note 3, § 10, at 47 (common law emphasized the “most reliable sources”); Dale A. 
Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 227 (1988) (going beyond the 
requirement of original documents, Nance argues that principles of evidence dictate that 
parties should always offer the court “the best evidence reasonably available on a litigated 
factual issue”). 
 70. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 602.02[1], at 602-3. 
 71. Garner, supra note 19, at 126. 
 72. See infra Part II. 
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hand knowledge, there are several forms of first-hand knowledge that are 
generally accepted as sufficient to satisfy Rule 701(a). 
First, the actual “observations of [an] event or situation” clearly fall 
within the definition of first-hand knowledge.73  In these situations, lay 
opinion testimony is often described as little more than a shorthand account 
of a situation74 where the witness is able to give useful and descriptive 
inferential statements instead of reciting exhaustive, detailed facts.75  
Similarly, a witness’s perception may also be based on a collection “of 
personal observations over time.”76 
Courts also often admit lay opinion testimony that is based on the 
witness’s first-hand perception of the incident in question coupled with 
background knowledge obtained “through earlier personal observations.”77  
Some courts take Rule 701 even further, allowing witnesses to provide 
 
 73. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-5. 
 74. See Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1196 (3d Cir. 
1995); 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 54; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, 
§ 701.03[1], at 701-5. 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Rodríguez-Vélez, 597 F.3d 32, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(admitting lay opinion testimony that the defendant and two others “had the strongest say” in 
staffing a drug surveillance tower, when the testimony was given by a witness who had 
participated in the narcotic conspiracy in question); United States v. Lane, 591 F.3d 921, 926 
(7th Cir. 2010) (finding that an officer who searched the defendant’s home could provide an 
opinion about which bedroom the defendant lived in); United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 
112, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the admittance of a co-conspirator’s lay opinion 
testimony about the meaning of his accomplice’s words in an intercepted phone call). 
 76. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-6.1 to -7; see, e.g., 
United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168, 179 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) (allowing a former gang 
member to testify to the effects an act of violence generally would have on a gang member’s 
status); United States v. Holmes, 229 F.3d 782, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that six 
meetings with the defendant, lasting at least thirty minutes each, formed a sufficient basis for 
the lay witness to offer an opinion about whether the defendant was the individual in bank 
surveillance photographs); United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1518 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that lay witnesses were allowed to give their opinions about the sheriff’s political 
power, when the testimony was based on extensive experience with the sheriff over a 
considerable period of time). 
 77. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-7; see, e.g., United States 
v. Gaines, 170 F.3d 72, 76–78 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding the trial court’s admission of lay 
opinion testimony proper, where the witness opined about the meaning of recorded calls in 
which the witness participated); Haun v. Ideal Indus. Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 548 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(admitting lay opinion testimony from a employee that the employer was “phasing out” older 
employees, where testimony was based upon various experiences throughout the employee’s 
time at the company).  Under this interpretation of 701(a), a court may allow homeowners 
and owners or officers of businesses to provide opinion testimony “about the value of the 
home or business.” 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-9; see also, 
e.g., Versai Mgmt. Corp. v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 597 F.3d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that a company president was permitted to provide “a broader range of 
testimony than a traditional lay witness” because of the knowledge obtained from her 
position); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 477 F.3d 128, 137–38 (4th Cir. 
2007) (finding that a homeowner could opine as to the value of his property).  Rule 701’s 
Advisory Committee note made clear that the 2000 amendment was not intended to affect 
this type of testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment).  
The Advisory Committee rationalized that such statements are not based on “experience, 
training or specialized knowledge,” but rather on the individual’s “particularized 
knowledge” that comes from her position. Id. 
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opinions based on “specialized knowledge obtained in his or her vocation or 
avocation.”78  However, at least one scholar, Anne Poulin, argues that this 
form of opinion testimony is wrongly admitted under Rule 701.79  She 
contends that courts that admit “experience-based” testimony without 
sufficient scrutiny permit the jury to hear “unreliable and unwarranted 
opinion testimony.”80 
Moving beyond the personal perception requirement, Rule 701(a) also 
requires that a lay witness’s testimony be “rationally based” on this first-
hand knowledge.81  The standard for a rational basis is not a high one.82  
Under this requirement a lay witness’s opinion must be reasonably based on 
the situation in question83 and be free from “irrational leaps of logic.”84  In 
other words, the witness must use “everyday” logic to reach her opinion.85  
Moreover, where lay opinion is based on the witness’s first-hand 
observation in conjunction with her personal knowledge, the witness may 
need to show that she indeed possesses the requisite knowledge to provide 
the stated opinion.86  Importantly, a lay witness is generally not permitted to 
use personal knowledge as the rational basis for the answer to a 
hypothetical question.87 
 
 78. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-10; see, e.g., United 
States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that a police officer’s opinion 
testimony, which was “[b]ased on [his] participation in numerous narcotics cases,” was 
admissible as lay testimony).  Questions remain regarding the extent to which the 2000 
amendments to Rules 701 and 702 prevent the admission of this kind of testimony. See 4 
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-13. 
 79. See Poulin, supra note 9, at 554. 
 80. Id. 
 81. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 82. 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 7:3, at 754. 
 83. See 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24, § 701.02[4], at 701-9. 
 84. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[2], at 701-17 to -18. 
 85. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment) (distinguishing lay 
opinion from expert opinion by characterizing lay testimony as “result[ing] from a process of 
reasoning familiar in everyday life” (quoting State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (Tenn. 
1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 
201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] lay opinion must be the product of reasoning processes 
familiar to the average person in everyday life.”); Alexis v. McDonald’s Rests. of Mass., 
Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 347 (1st Cir. 1995) (excluding lay opinion testimony, where no basis was 
provided for the opinion that the employee in question acted with “race-based animus”); 
United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871, 875–76 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding inadmissible impression 
testimony that did not rationally flow from the facts provided); 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 
supra note 59, § 701.03[2], at 701-17 n.16 (“Rational connection means [that a] normal 
person would form [the same] opinion from those perceptions.”). 
 86. For example, to testify that something smelled like dynamite, the witness must first 
establish that, based on prior experiences, she knows the smell of dynamite. 1 BROUN, supra 
note 3, § 11, at 57 n.30; see also, e.g., Eason v. Barber, 365 S.E.2d 672, 674–75 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1988) (allowing a seventeen year old with nine months of driving experience and a 
eighteen year old with fifteen months of driving experience to testify to the speed of a 
vehicle). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that lay witnesses are not permitted to answer hypothetical questions and noting that the 
distinguishing quality of an expert witness is the entitlement to answer hypothetical 
questions); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 1980) 
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2.  Rule 701(b) and the Requirement That Testimony                                    
Be Helpful to the Fact-Finder 
The second prong of Rule 701, 701(b), requires that lay opinion 
testimony be “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to 
determining a fact in issue.”88  This limitation has been liberally interpreted 
in accordance with the modern trend of permitting the fact-finder to hear 
opinion testimony.89  The most common situations when lay opinion 
testimony is considered helpful include when “[t]he lay witness is in a 
better position than the trier of fact to form the opinion,”90 when stating the 
facts alone would be inadequate to provide the jury with a “complete 
understanding” of the situation,91 or when “[t]he witness has specialized 
information” unavailable to the fact-finder.92 
However, not all lay opinions fall within the definition of helpfulness.  
There are several categories of lay opinion testimony that are commonly not 
 
(characterizing the “essential difference” between an expert witness and a lay witness as the 
ability to answer hypothetical questions); see also infra note 102 and accompanying text. But 
see Poulin, supra note 9, at 575 (arguing that it would be inaccurate to assert that lay 
witnesses can never answer hypothetical questions and offering an example of a hypothetical 
that a lay witness could conceivably answer). 
 88. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 89. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-21 (“[Rule 701] 
reflects the modern trend to allow the admission of opinion testimony, provided that it is 
well founded on personal knowledge and susceptible to specific cross-examination.” 
(quoting Joy Mfg. Co. v. Sola Basic Indus. Inc., 697 F.2d 104, 111 (3d Cir. 1982))). 
 90. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-21; see also, e.g., United 
States v. Shabazz, 564 F.3d 280, 286–87 (3d Cir. 2009) (admitting testimony of the 
defendant’s accomplice that the defendant was the individual in surveillance video, where 
the witness participated in the events the video depicted); United States v. Kornegay, 410 
F.3d 89, 95 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that a detective’s identification of the defendant met the 
helpfulness prong of Rule 701, where the detective observed the defendant six times “for the 
sole purpose of distinguishing him from his twin brother”). 
 91. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-23; see, e.g., United 
States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1430 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowing statements of opinion that the 
defendant was “out of control” at the time of the incident because it would be difficult to 
convey through facts alone), rev’d in part on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996); Virgin 
Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 629–30 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that eyewitness testimony 
that the shooting was accidental was admissible as lay opinion because it would be difficult 
to accurately articulate why the gun did not seem to be fired on purpose); United States v. 
McCullah, 745 F.2d 350, 352 (6th Cir. 1984) (admitting testimony that described the 
location in question as “hidden”); see also Poulin, supra note 9, at 564 (explaining that a lay 
witness may use opinion both “to express information that cannot be conveyed through a 
bare factual account” and to “enrich understanding by adding depth and clarity to [her] 
account”). 
 92. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-24; see also, e.g., United 
States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2005) (permitting testimony from the 
arresting officer regarding drug points of distribution and heroin packaging because of the 
nature of his position in a neighborhood with drug points).  Precedent in this area is of 
questionable value in light of the 2000 amendments to Rule 701. See 4 WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-13.  For a more complete discussion of the 2000 
amendments to Rule 701, see supra notes 45–60 and accompanying text.  Also, for 
additional supporting cases, see 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03, at 701-21 
to -24 nn.26–28. 
 3454 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
considered to satisfy the helpfulness prong of Rule 701.  These include 
instances when “[t]he evidence is clear and the trier of fact is perfectly 
capable of perceiving, understanding, and interpreting it”;93 the witness 
testifies about an issue that generally the fact-finder alone should 
determine;94 or the witness offers an opinion about the law.95 
While courts generally find that lay opinion testimony is admissible 
under Rule 701 even when the opinion is not necessary for the jury’s 
decision-making process,96 judges still maintain significant discretion in 
determining when to admit lay opinion testimony.97  Accordingly, the 
helpfulness requirement acts as a tool for judges to control which lay 
opinion testimony to admit or exclude.98 
3.  Rule 701(c) and the Bar on Scientific, Technical, 
or Specialized Knowledge 
Finally, 701(c), as explained above,99 was implemented in 2000 to better 
draw the line between lay testimony and expert testimony,100 limiting lay 
testimony to opinions “not based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”101  Further, under 
701(c) lay witnesses generally cannot provide opinions in response to a 
hypothetical question,102 as their opinions can be based only on the actual 
situation of which they possess first-hand knowledge. 
 
 93. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03, at 701-26; see also, e.g., United 
States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 515–16 (1st Cir. 2011) (excluding a lay witness’s 
testimony that she did not believe the defendant’s story because the jury was in “a far 
superior position” to make that determination based on the evidence before it); Hester v. BIC 
Corp., 225 F.3d 178, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding testimony that the supervisor’s actions 
were racially motivated to be inadmissible because the witness was in no better position to 
make this determination than the jury). 
 94. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-27; see also, e.g., United 
States v. Gaines, 170 F.3d 72, 81 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that questions of credibility are for 
the jury alone); United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1995) (asserting that the 
jury determines credibility). 
 95. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-28.  For additional 
supporting cases see id. at § 701.03[3], at 701-26 to -27 nn.30–33. 
 96. Poulin, supra note 9, at 557–58; see also FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s 
note (“[N]ecessity as a standard for permitting opinions and conclusions has proved too 
elusive and too unadaptable to particular situations for purposes of satisfactory judicial 
administration.”); 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 55 (explaining that “Federal Rule of 
Evidence 701 codifies ‘convenience’ as the standard” rather than necessity). 
 97. See 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24, § 701.02, at 701-4 to -5; Garner, supra note 
19, at 127. 
 98. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-21. 
 99. See supra notes 45–60 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Poulin, supra note 9, at 559. 
 101. FED. R. EVID. 701; see also id. advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment). 
 102. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200, 203–04 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (finding error where the lower court allowed the lay witness to answer 
hypothetical questions); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 
1980) (describing the fundamental difference between testimony under Rule 701 and Rule 
702 as the ability to answer hypothetical questions); see also 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra 
note 59, § 701.03[4][a], at 701-31; supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 2013]  YOU MUST BE THIS QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN OPINION 3455 
D.  Responses to Rule 701’s Potential Problems 
While the same concerns that existed at common law remain regarding 
the appropriate role of opinions in lay testimony, Rule 701’s Advisory 
Committee note assures that mechanisms exist to prevent the liberalization 
of the opinion testimony rule from having detrimental effects on fact-finder 
determinations.103  First, the general nature of the adversary system will 
continue to encourage lawyers to present the most factually detailed cases 
possible in an effort to convince the jury of their arguments.104  Despite the 
inclusion of lay opinion testimony, the jury remains the ultimate decider of 
what testimony amounts to compelling evidence.  Commentators and courts 
maintain that juries are fully capable of giving broad opinions not based in 
fact the proper weight and consideration.105  This opinion, however, is not 
held universally, as some argue that juries are not impervious to influential 
opinion testimony.106  At least one commentator has pointed to opinion 
testimony from law enforcement officers as particularly problematic in 
terms of invading the jury’s independent review of the evidence.107 
Second, the Advisory Committee note defends the liberalization of the 
opinion rule by arguing that cross-examination and closing statements 
inherently function to highlight any unreliable or illogical assertions a 
witness may make.108  Such mechanisms thereby decrease the influence of 
lay opinion testimony.109  Finally, the Advisory Committee note asserts that 
when the mechanisms of the adversary system prove insufficient to exclude 
 
 103. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note. 
 104. See id. (“[T]he detailed account carries more conviction than the broad assertion 
. . . .”); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1929, at 124 (“[I]nference amounts in force usually to 
nothing unless it appears to be solidly based on satisfactory data.”). 
 105. See Grismore v. Consol. Prods. Co., 5 N.W.2d 646, 656 (Iowa 1942) (finding that, 
whether fact or opinion, the jury has full rein to accept or reject a witness’s testimony); 
1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 12, at 62 (describing the notion that opinion testimony will usurp 
the role of the jury as “illogic”); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1920, at 115–16 (arguing that 
opinion testimony does not invade the province of the jury because the jury has the power to 
reject the opinion and embrace its own view of the evidence); see also Garner, supra note 
19, at 126. 
 106. See 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6252, at 109–10.  Wright and Gold noted: 
Nineteenth Century evidence law often assumed that juries lack ability to detect 
unreliable evidence.  If that assumption is correct, then a jury would be unable to 
reject unreliable lay opinion.  In this sense . . . the jury might be unable to prevent 
usurpation of its power to draw inferences from the evidence.  However, Rule 701 
simply rejects this pessimistic view of jury ability. 
Id. 
 107. Deon J. Nossel, The Admissibility of Ultimate Issue Expert Testimony by Law 
Enforcement Officers in Criminal Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 249 (1993) (arguing that 
expert testimony from law enforcement officers may unconsciously influence jurors’ 
perceptions of the defendant and lead jurors to accept the officer’s conclusions based entirely 
upon the officer’s qualification as a expert).  While Nossel’s article specifically analyzes 
expert law enforcement testimony, the same arguments apply to officers in the cases studied 
in this Note. See infra Part III.A. 
 108. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note. 
 109. See id.; Hand, supra note 24, at 98 (suggesting that the “analysis of the basis for the 
witness’s conclusions” should be done during cross-examination). 
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baseless opinion testimony that “amount[s] to little more than choosing up 
sides,” the testimony will likely fail the helpfulness prong of the Rule and 
be ruled inadmissible.110 
E.  Practical Application of Rule 701 
One of the most valuable cases for understanding the common uses of 
Rule 701 is United States v. Yazzie.111  The defendant, Johnny Yazzie, Jr., 
was charged with statutory rape.112  Under the federal statutory rape statute, 
Yazzie was permitted to present the defense that he reasonably believed the 
minor was at least sixteen years old at the time of the incident.113  To 
support his belief, Yazzie presented several witnesses who agreed that the 
victim seemed to be at least sixteen years old.114  The trial court ruled that 
these witnesses could not testify as to their opinion that the victim seemed 
to be of a certain age and required the lay witnesses to provide only factual 
observations, such as the fact that she smoked cigarettes or wore make-up 
on the night of the incident.115 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that testimony regarding the victim’s 
apparent age was admissible under Rule 701.116  The court concluded that 
the perception of someone else’s age is exactly the kind of testimony that 
may be valuable to a jury but is “difficult to put into words” without 
expressing a certain level of opinion.117  The court further emphasized that 
“age is a matter on which everyone has an opinion” and, accordingly, is the 
type of testimony that is well suited for admissibility under Rule 701.118 
As Yazzie demonstrates, in certain circumstances the most valuable lay 
testimony will be testimony in the form of an opinion.  Additional examples 
of typical Rule 701 opinion testimony include the identification of a 
 
 110. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note. 
 111. 976 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor 
Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995) (calling Yazzie “[p]erhaps the best judicial 
description of” Rule 701 testimony); 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24, § 701.02, at 701-6 
(finding Yazzie to contain a “valuable application of Rule 701”). 
 112. Yazzie, 976 F.2d at 1253. See generally 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24, 
§ 701.02, at 701-6 to -8 (summarizing Yazzie). 
 113. Yazzie, 976 F.2d at 1253. 
 114. Id. at 1254. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1255. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1256. 
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person,119 a vehicle’s speed,120 an individual’s emotional121 or mental 
state,122 and the status of someone’s health.123 
II.  APPLYING RULE 701 TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ 
LAY OPINION TESTIMONY 
In criminal prosecutions, it is common for law enforcement officers to 
testify as to the specifics of the criminal investigations in question, as well 
as to law enforcement related issues more generally.124  As with all 
testimony, for a law enforcement officer to provide general opinion 
testimony that does not derive from personal knowledge, but rather from 
scientific or specialized knowledge, he must be certified as an expert.125  
Whether a law enforcement officer is certified as an expert witness depends 
largely on the officer’s ability to satisfy the requirements of Rule 702.126  
This Note examines the instances when a law enforcement officer is not 
certified as an expert and, accordingly, is limited to providing layperson 
testimony. 
As explained in Part I.C, witnesses are only permitted to offer lay 
opinion testimony when they meet Rule 701’s requirements of personal 
perception and helpfulness.127  All the circuit courts agree that some lay 
opinion testimony from law enforcement officers is admissible under Rule 
701.128  For example, in many of the cases that this Note analyzes, the law 
enforcement officer is interpreting recorded conversations.129  Courts agree 
that an individual who took part in the conversation should be permitted 
under Rule 701 to testify as to the conversation’s meaning.130  Such 
witnesses were able to “see and judge facial expressions and body language 
of the other participants” and, therefore, possess a unique perspective on the 
situation, which a jury simply listening to the recorded conversation would 
 
 119. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 809 A.2d 584, 596 (D.C. 2002) (admitting lay 
opinion testimony identifying the individual in a surveillance video). 
 120. See, e.g., United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 552 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing the 
speed of a car as a “common illustration[]” of lay opinion testimony). 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1556–57 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding 
that no error existed where lay witnesses were permitted to testify as to the defendant’s 
emotional state at the time of the incident in question). 
 122. See, e.g., Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1271 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that lay 
testimony can be sufficient evidence to establish an individual’s sanity). 
 123. See, e.g., Singletary v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 
1980) (permitting a lay witness to testify about the state of his father’s alcoholism). 
 124. See Nossel, supra note 107, at 231. 
 125. See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See supra Parts I.C.1–2; see also FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 128. See 4 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING:  
SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 41.24 (2012). 
 129. See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1101–02 (11th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 
640 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 130. See 4 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 128, § 41.24, at 41-38 to -39 & n.3 (quoting 
Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641). 
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not have.131  Thus, such testimony satisfies both the personal perception 
and helpfulness prongs of Rule 701. 
This Note explores the less clear-cut scenario where a law enforcement 
officer who possesses general knowledge of the case’s investigation, gained 
largely or entirely from an after-the-fact review of investigation materials, 
is asked to testify as a lay witness about specifics of the investigation.  
Three approaches to this type of situation have emerged within the federal 
circuit courts. 
Part II.A explores the approaches of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits,132 
which have embraced the broadest reading of Rule 701.  These circuits 
allow a law enforcement officer to testify about the specifics of an 
investigation based solely on an after-the-fact review of the investigation 
materials.133  Part II.B outlines the pertinent lay opinion decisions in the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits.134  Both circuits have allowed law enforcement 
officers to testify about specific aspects of an investigation where the 
officer’s after-the-fact knowledge of the event in question was combined 
with first-hand knowledge of related information.135  Finally, Part II.C 
focuses on the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits’ narrow interpretations 
of Rule 701.136  These circuits have refused to admit law enforcement 
officers’ lay opinion testimony where the testimony was not based on 
personal, first-hand knowledge of the specific event in question that 
extended beyond simply reviewing the investigation record.137 
A.  Tenth and Eleventh Circuits:  The Broadest Readings of Rule 701 
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretations of Rule 701 allow lay 
opinion testimony from law enforcement officers who have general 
knowledge of the investigation in question, without requiring personal 
perception of the actual events about which the witness is testifying.138  The 
controlling cases in these circuits are United States v. Zepeda-Lopez139 and 
United States v. Jayyousi.140 
 
 131. Id.; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085; United States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213 (10th 
Cir. 2007). 
 133. See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1101–04; Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1221–23. 
 134. United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Freeman, 
498 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 135. See Rollins, 544 F.3d at 830–33; Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904–05. 
 136. United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 413 
F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 137. See Johnson, 617 F.3d at 292–93; Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211–15; Peoples, 250 F.3d at 
639–43. 
 138. See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102; Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1215. 
 139. 478 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 140. 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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1.  United States v. Jayyousi 
In Jayyousi, the Eleventh Circuit allowed FBI Agent John Kavanaugh to 
testify as a lay witness to the meaning of supposed coded words used in 
calls between the defendants.141  During his testimony, Agent Kavanaugh 
made many observations, providing testimony such as that the words 
“football” and “soccer” actually meant “jihad” and the word “sneakers” 
actually meant “support.”142  The agent based his testimony entirely on his 
after-the-fact review of the investigation materials.143  This included 
“read[ing] thousands of wiretap summaries plus hundreds of verbatim 
transcripts, as well as faxes, publications, and speeches” over a five-year 
period.144  Although the intercepted calls were mostly in Arabic, Agent 
Kavanaugh did not speak that language,145 and someone else provided the 
translations into English.146  His testimony was based largely on documents 
that were already admitted into evidence.147 
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the appellants’ argument regarding 
Rule 701(a).148  Appellants asserted that the agent’s opinion testimony 
should be deemed inadmissible “because he was not present during all of 
the intercepted calls and he did not have a rationally based perception of 
what the individuals meant when they used the code words.”149 
In response, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that it had never found that 
a lay witness must “particip[ate in] or observ[e] . . . a conversation to 
provide testimony about the meaning of coded language” within the 
conversation.150  The court further asserted that lay witness testimony was 
admissible even where “the witness was not involved in the activity about 
which he testified.”151 
The court cited two other Eleventh Circuit cases to support this 
proposition,152 characterizing both cases in an entirely different manner 
than the dissent.153  According to the Jayyousi court, the Eleventh Circuit 
had held in United States v. Hamaker154 that a FBI financial analyst 
possessed sufficient first-hand perception to provide lay opinion testimony, 
 
 141. Id. at 1104.  It is important to note that in Jayyousi the Eleventh Circuit quotes Rule 
701’s Advisory Committee note, id. at 1120–21, which states that 701(a)’s limitation that lay 
witness testimony be “rationally based on the witness’s perception.” FED. R. EVID. 701(a) 
advisory committee’s note.  This speaks to the “familiar requirement of first-hand 
knowledge or observation.” Id. 
 142. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1095. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. at 1102. 
 145. Id. at 1122 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 1102 (majority opinion). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1102–03. 
 153. Id. at 1124 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 154. 455 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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where the analyst “simply reviewed and summarized over seven thousand 
financial documents.”155  Further, the Jayyousi court explained that in 
United States v. Gold,156 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a lay witness 
possessed first-hand knowledge when the witness’s knowledge was based 
on his “own examination of . . . store[] records.”157 
The court argued that the testimony in both cases satisfied the 
requirements of Rule 701(a) because the testimony was “‘rationally based’ 
on [the witnesses’] perception of business records.”158  Analogizing Agent 
Kavanaugh’s knowledge of the investigation to the facts in Hamaker and 
Gold, the Eleventh Circuit found that the agent’s “testimony was also based 
on a review of documents and ‘rationally based on [his] perception.’”159 
The court distinguished the agent’s testimony from testimony that simply 
summarizes admitted evidence by highlighting that the agent reviewed 
“thousands of documents, many of which were not admitted into 
evidence.”160  Moreover, the majority found that the agent’s extensive 
knowledge of the investigation enabled him to understand the supposed 
coded language in a way that the less knowledgeable jury would be 
incapable of doing.161 
Emphasizing further the agent’s cumulative knowledge of the 
investigation, the majority also addressed Rule 701(b)’s requirement of 
helpfulness.162  According to the majority, Agent Kavanaugh’s opinion 
testimony satisfied this requirement because his inferences about the 
meaning of the alleged coded language would “help[] the jury understand 
better the defendants’ conversation that related to their support of 
international terrorism because [the jury] ‘would likely be unfamiliar with 
the complexities’ of terrorist activities.”163 
The Jayyousi decision also contained an opinion from Judge Rosemary 
Barkett concurring in part and dissenting in part.164  Judge Barkett strongly 
disagreed with the majority’s lay-opinion-testimony analysis,165 concluding 
that Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony was not rationally based on any “first-
hand knowledge or observation,” but instead was based entirely on his 
general involvement in the case.166  In the course of this argument, the 
 
 155. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102 (majority opinion) (quoting Hamaker, 455 F.3d at 1331–
32) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156. 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 157. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102–03 (quoting Gold, 743 F.2d at 817) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  For the dissent’s conflicting analysis of Hamaker and Gold, see infra notes 
167–69 and accompanying text. 
 158. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701(a)) (citation omitted). 
 159. Id. at 1103 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701(a)). 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701(b)). 
 163. Id. (quoting United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1430–31 (11th Cir. 1992)). 
 164. Id. at 1119 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 1121–22 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s 
note). 
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dissent asserted that the court’s reliance on Gold and Hamaker was 
erroneous.167  First, the dissent found Gold to be inapplicable because the 
case involved the “long-standing practice” of allowing business owners “to 
testify to the value or projected profits of the business.”168  Second, 
Hamaker did not provide precedent because the court was only answering 
whether the witness in question was an expert and never discussed whether 
reviewing business records satisfies the first-hand knowledge requirement 
of Rule 701.169 
The dissent found it particularly problematic that Agent Kavanaugh’s 
general involvement in the case was his only basis for providing testimony 
regarding the “‘true meaning’ of the defendants’ words.”170  The agent 
described no specific knowledge or perception that he possessed to make 
him more capable than the jury of interpreting the phone calls.171 
Moreover, the dissent argued that opinion testimony should be 
admissible under Rule 701(a) only when the witness has “personally 
experienced an event and therefore ha[s] the ability to describe [his] 
layperson’s perception of the event that the jury cannot otherwise 
experience for itself.”172  Indeed, the unique characteristic of this type of 
knowledge, according to the dissenting opinion, is that the witness uses his 
“sensory and experiential observations that were made as a first-hand 
witness to a particular event.”173 
Turning to the specific instance of a law enforcement officer testifying 
about the meaning of a conversation, the dissent gave the following 
definition for first-hand knowledge: 
A law enforcement officer’s lay opinion about the meaning of a 
conversation is based on his or her first-hand knowledge when he or she 
is either (1) a personal participant in a conversation as an undercover 
agent, or (2) a listener to a conversation while observing a defendants’ 
behavior in real time to coordinate the conversation with the conduct.174 
The dissent further stated that the facts of Jayyousi were “materially 
indistinguishable” from the facts of United States v. Peoples,175 in which 
the Eighth Circuit found that such law enforcement testimony was 
 
 167. Id. at 1124. 
 168. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment)); see 
supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 169. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1125. 
 170. Id. at 1122. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1120. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1123. 
 175. 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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inadmissible.176  The dissent also cited United States v. Garcia,177 a Second 
Circuit case that stands for the same general proposition.178 
On the issue of the helpfulness requirement of 701(b), the dissent further 
disagreed with the majority’s characterization of Agent Kavanaugh’s 
opinion testimony as “‘helpful’” within the meaning of Rule 701.179  As the 
dissent explained, while “a witness simply agree[ing] with the contentions 
of one side” may be helpful in some sense of the word, Rule 701 is not 
intended to allow lay witnesses to give testimony that does nothing more 
than “give one side’s understanding of the evidence.”180 
2.  United States v. Zepeda-Lopez 
In Zepeda-Lopez the Tenth Circuit came to the same conclusion as the 
Eleventh Circuit regarding Rule 701, allowing FBI Special Agent John 
Barrett to testify that it was the defendant’s voice on audiotapes and image 
in a videotape.181  While the parties had already stipulated to the existence 
of a drug conspiracy, the question remained whether defendant Jesus 
Salvador Zepeda-Lopez was a member of the conspiracy.182  Of the six 
telephone calls admitted into evidence, Zepeda-Lopez admitted that his 
voice was on three of them but denied that his voice was on another call.183  
Agent Barrett, the prosecution’s only witness, testified as to which voices 
on the tapes belonged to Zepeda-Lopez.184  The agent provided similar 
testimony regarding Zepeda-Lopez’s alleged image in a video.185  Agent 
Barrett’s testimony was based solely on his review of the same tapes that 
were offered into evidence.186 
The defendant argued for the exclusion of the agent’s testimony because 
Agent Barrett “lacked personal knowledge of Mr. Zepeda-Lopez’s voice 
and appearance”187 and “had an inadequate basis” for the identifications.188  
Further, the defendant asserted that the jury was just as capable as the agent 
to determine whether it was the defendant’s voice in the recorded calls and 
 
 176. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1124 (citing Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641).  For a complete 
discussion of the opinion in Peoples, see infra Part II.C.1. 
 177. 413 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 178. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1124 (citing Garcia, 413 F.3d at 212).  For a complete 
discussion of the opinion in Garcia, see infra Part II.C.2. 
 179. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1125. 
 180. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (“If . . . attempts are made 
to introduce meaningless assertions which amount to little more than choosing up sides, 
exclusion for lack of helpfulness is called for by the rule.”). 
 181. United States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 1215–16. 
 184. Id. at 1215. 
 185. Id. at 1217. 
 186. Id. at 1215–17. 
 187. Id. at 1219. 
 188. Id. at 1220 (quoting Brief of Defendant Appellant at 13, Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 
1213 (No. 05-4246)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the defendant’s image in the video and, therefore, the testimony was not 
helpful.189 
The court addressed the appeal by analyzing Agent Barrett’s testimony 
under Rule 701(b), making no mention of the defendant’s Rule 701(a) 
argument.190  The court relied in part on the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
United States v. Bush.191  In Bush, a law enforcement officer identified the 
defendant in recorded calls after having conducted at least three face-to-face 
interviews with the defendant in question.192  Finding that the trial court 
had not abused its discretion, the court in Zepeda-Lopez held that, like in 
Bush, Agent Barrett’s testimony satisfied the helpfulness prong of Rule 701 
because the agent had an opportunity to review the videotapes “many 
times.”193 
The Tenth Circuit concluded its discussion of Rule 701 by restating the 
district court’s instruction to the jury that it should consider the truth value 
of all admitted evidence, including testimony.194  In particular, the district 
court asserted that the jury should consider witnesses’ “relationship to the 
government or the defendant” and “their opportunity to observe or acquire 
knowledge concerning the facts about which they testified.”195 
B.  Seventh and Ninth Circuits:  The Moderate Readings of Rule 701 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have taken a somewhat different 
approach than the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits to lay opinion testimony 
based on after-the-fact reviews.  Where a law enforcement officer’s after-
the-fact knowledge of the event in question is combined with related first-
hand knowledge, these circuits have allowed the officer to offer lay opinion 
testimony.196  The controlling cases in these circuits are United States v. 
Freeman197 and United States v. Rollins.198 
1.  United States v. Freeman 
In Freeman, the Ninth Circuit found no error where the district court 
admitted a detective’s lay interpretations of recorded phone calls.199  
Detective Bob Shin, the prosecution’s lead witness,200 opined on the 
meaning of the supposed drug jargon used between defendant Kevin 
Freeman and two of his alleged co-conspirators.201  The detective explained 
 
 189. Id. at 1222. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. (citing United States v. Bush, 405 F.3d 909, 918 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 1222–23. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See infra notes 204–06, 212–13 and accompanying text. 
 197. 498 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 198. 544 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 199. Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904–05. 
 200. Id. at 898. 
 201. Id. 
 3464 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
that while there was no explicit reference to cocaine, the calls indeed 
referenced cocaine-related drug transactions.202  Though not a party to the 
conversations, Detective Shin based his testimony on his “direct perception 
of several hours of intercepted conversations—in some instances coupled 
with direct observation of [the suspects]—and other facts he learned during 
the investigation.”203 
Finding that Detective Shin satisfied the requirements of Rule 701, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that the detective’s perception of the conversations 
amounted to “direct knowledge.”204  Further, the court noted that 
throughout his testimony, the detective attempted to “explain his reasoning 
and the basis for his opinion.”205  This basis included “context and his 
knowledge of the investigation as it was unfolding.”206 
2.  United States v. Rollins 
Following the approach of the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit in 
Rollins admitted lay opinion testimony from DEA Agent John McGarry 
regarding the general meaning of recorded telephone conversations.207  The 
agent testified that based on the recorded calls, he believed that defendant 
James E. Rollins, Sr. was supplying Richard Pittman with cocaine obtained 
from James Rollins, Jr.208  Agent McGarry’s testimony was based both on 
his review of the recorded calls and his subsequent surveillance of the 
conspirators and interviews with witnesses familiar with both the 
conspiracy and the defendants.209  Agent McGarry testified that through 
surveillance the case agents often were able to confirm their suspicions 
about the meaning of the recorded calls.210  The witness interviews further 
provided Agent McGarry with information to enlighten his understanding 
of the recorded calls.211 
Upon outlining the several bases for Agent McGarry’s testimony, the 
Seventh Circuit determined that the agent possessed a sufficient foundation 
for providing lay opinion testimony about the recorded calls.212  The court 
characterized his knowledge as both “first-hand perception of the 
intercepted phone calls” and “personal, extensive experience with this 
particular drug investigation.”213  In the course of its analysis, the Seventh 
Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Second Circuit’s conception of 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 904–05. 
 204. Id. at 904. 
 205. Id. at 900. 
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 207. United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 831 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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permissible lay opinion testimony as explained in United States v. 
Grinage.214 
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished Rollins from its decision in 
United States v. Oriedo215 by explaining that the agent’s testimony in 
Oriedo was impermissible because it was not based solely on knowledge 
gained from his investigation of that case.216  Regardless of this distinction, 
however, the Ninth Circuit conceded that Agent McGarry’s “testimony 
approache[d] the line dividing lay opinion testimony from expert opinion 
testimony.”217 
C.  Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits:  
The Narrowest Readings of Rule 701 
The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have limited admissible lay 
opinion by more narrowly interpreting the definitions of first-hand 
knowledge and helpfulness.218  First-hand knowledge in these circuits 
requires a substantial personal relationship to the event in question, such as 
through observation or participation.219  The controlling cases in these 
circuits are United States v. People,220 United States v. Garcia,221 and 
United States v. Johnson.222 
1.  United States v. Peoples 
In Peoples, the Eighth Circuit held that FBI Special Agent Joan Neal’s 
testimony about recorded telephone conversations and prison visitations 
was inadmissible because she lacked first-hand knowledge of the 
conversations at issue.223  Xavier Lightfoot was arrested and charged with 
robbery.224  During his pretrial incarceration Lightfoot learned that his 
former roommate, Jovan Ross, was cooperating with law enforcement.225  
According to the government, Cornelius Peoples feared that if Ross 
continued to cooperate with law enforcement, Peoples’ role in the robbery 
would be revealed.226  The government theorized that, in response Ross’s 
 
 214. Id. at 832; see infra note 253 and accompanying text (explaining that Garcia 
affirmed the holding in Grinage). 
 215. 498 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding testimony impermissible where a lay law 
enforcement officer was asked about the general use of a certain type of baggie). 
 216. Rollins, 544 F.3d at 832–33. 
 217. Id. at 833. 
 218. See United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th 
Cir. 2001). 
 219. See Johnson, 617 F.3d at 293; Garcia, 413 F.3d at 213; Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641. 
 220. 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 221. 413 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 222. 617 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 223. Peoples, 250 F.3d at 639–42. 
 224. Id. at 634. 
 225. Id. 
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cooperation, Peoples and Lightfoot entered into an agreement to pay 
someone to kill Ross.227 
During the trial, the government played conversations between Lightfoot 
and Peoples that were recorded when Peoples visited Lightfoot in jail.228  
While the recordings played to the jury, Agent Neal was allowed to opine 
as to the meaning of the speakers’ words.229  She interpreted both allegedly 
coded language and statements made in plain English.230  For example, 
when a recording of Lightfoot asking for a loan was played, Agent Neal 
testified that Lightfoot had “need[ed] a loan to pay the hit man to actually 
murder Ross.”231 
The court found that Agent Neal’s testimony was improperly admitted as 
Rule 701 lay opinion testimony,232 because Agent Neal neither personally 
observed the activities that the conversations concerned nor heard or 
observed the conversation itself.233  Instead, the court described Agent 
Neal’s knowledge of the matter as based only on an after-the-fact 
investigation and “not on her perception of the facts.”234  The Eighth 
Circuit characterized this type of testimony as “a narrative gloss” on the 
facts of the case, comprised entirely of her opinion about the conversations’ 
meanings.235 
Indeed, despite admitting the lay opinion testimony of Agent Neal, the 
lower court recognized that the testimony should be viewed differently than 
normal witness testimony.236  Acknowledging that it was possible that 
Agent Neal’s testimony was inadmissible under Rule 701, the lower court 
instructed jurors to consider the testimony not as evidence but as “snippets 
of early argument from the witness stand.”237  The Eighth Circuit found that 
this instruction had no basis in the Federal Rules of Evidence and served the 
practical function of making inadmissible testimony admissible.238 
The court pointed to Rule 602 in order to emphasize that a lay witness 
must possess “personal knowledge of the matters about which she 
testifies.”239  Accordingly, the court offered only three circumstances when 
law enforcement officers can provide lay opinion testimony regarding 
recorded conversations.240  These included “when the law enforcement 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 634–35. 
 229. Id. at 640. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 232. Id. at 641–42. 
 233. Id. at 640. 
 234. Id. at 641. 
 235. Id. at 640 (“[F]or example, she testified that when one of the defendants referred to 
buying a plane ticket for Ross, he in fact meant killing Ross.”). 
 236. See id. at 641. 
 237. Id. at 640–41 (quoting United States v. Peoples, No. 98-00149-01/02-CR-W-6, 2000 
WL 97180, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 25, 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 238. Id. at 641–42. 
 239. Id. at 641.  For the full text of Rule 602, see supra note 68. 
 240. Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641. 
 2013]  YOU MUST BE THIS QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN OPINION 3467 
officer is a participant in the conversation, has personal knowledge of the 
facts being related in the conversation, or observed the conversations as 
they occurred.”241  Additionally, the court made a point to distinguish lay 
opinion testimony from expert testimony, stating that “[l]ay opinion 
testimony is admissible only to help the jury or the court to understand the 
facts about which the witness is testifying and not to provide specialized 
explanations or interpretations that an untrained layman could not make if 
perceiving the same acts or events.”242 
2.  United States v. Garcia 
Similar to the Eighth Circuit in Peoples, the Second Circuit’s Garcia 
decision held that DEA Agent Paul Klemick’s opinion testimony was 
inadmissible because the agent’s testimony was neither based on his 
personal perceptions243 nor helpful to the jury.244  The prosecution admitted 
into evidence several recorded phone calls between defendants Yuri Garcia 
and Francisco Valentin, as well as conversations between the two 
defendants and other members of the alleged drug conspiracy.245  
Following the admission of these calls, Agent Klemick was asked to testify 
regarding the roles he believed Garcia and Valentin played in the 
conspiracy.246  The prosecution asked Agent Klemick to testify based on his 
general experience with the investigation.247  Subsequently, the agent 
testified that his opinion was grounded on the recorded phone calls, as well 
as the law enforcement database and surveillance.248 
The Second Circuit found several problems with admitting this testimony 
under Rule 701.  First, the court found that Agent Klemick’s testimony 
failed to meet the requirements of 701(a) because it was not “based on the 
witness’s personal perceptions.”249  Quoting Rule 701’s Advisory 
Committee note, the court emphasized that the “‘traditional objective’” of 
Rule 701 is to provide the fact-finder with “‘an accurate reproduction of the 
event’ at issue,” an objective that may sometimes require admitting 
inferential or opinion testimony from laypersons.250  However, the court 
emphasized the distinction between a law enforcement officer’s lay opinion 
testimony that is based on personal perceptions and lay opinion testimony 
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that is based on the entirety of an investigation.251  The Second Circuit 
explained that Agent Klemick’s opinion testimony did not meet the 
requirements of 701(a) because it “drew on the total information developed 
by all the officials who participated in the investigation” and “was not 
limited to his personal perceptions.”252  Summarizing and affirming the 
holding in Grinage, the Second Circuit explained that this type of opinion 
testimony does not fall within Rule 701 because it does “not present[] the 
jury with the unique insights of an eyewitness’s personal perceptions.”253 
Second, the court found that Agent Klemick’s testimony was not helpful 
under Rule 701(b) because it did little more than summarize the admitted 
evidence in a way that told the jury how to decide the case.254  The Second 
Circuit concluded that procedural limitations are placed on opinion 
testimony specifically to ensure that witnesses do not invade the province of 
the jury.255  The court further emphasized that if such testimony were 
admissible, jurors reviewing evidence would be unnecessary, as witnesses 
simply would hand them the proper analysis.256 
3.  United States v. Johnson 
Citing Peoples in its decision, the Fourth Circuit in Johnson found that 
DEA Agent Randy Smith’s lay opinion testimony about the meaning of 
recorded phone calls was inadmissible based on his lack of personal 
perception.257  At trial, Agent Smith testified to the meaning of four phone 
calls, which allegedly pointed to defendant Walter Johnson’s involvement 
in a drug conspiracy.258  The phone calls were between Johnson and an 
individual named Mayo Pickens, who provided cocaine in the area.259  
Agent Smith was not a participant in the investigation’s surveillance and 
did not “listen[] to all of the relevant calls in question.”260  Instead, the 
agent based his testimony regarding the phone calls on “information from 
interviews with suspects and charged members of the conspiracy after 
listening to the phone calls.”261  The court further noted that the prosecution 
had elicited testimony regarding the agent’s “credentials and training,” 
despite not attempting to certify him as an expert.262 
The court characterized the knowledge obtained from the suspect 
interviews as “second-hand information” and the conclusions he formed as 
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a result of this information to be “post-hoc assessments.”263  Further, the 
court analogized Johnson to the facts of Peoples, finding that Agent Smith 
similarly lacked first-hand knowledge about the investigation in question 
and provided no more than “a narrative gloss that consisted almost entirely 
of her personal opinions of what the conversations meant.”264 
III.  REINING IN THE USE OF LAY OPINION TESTIMONY TO ACHIEVE 
RULE 701’S OBJECTIVES 
Jurors are intended to be fair and impartial triers of fact.  Accordingly, 
they should never possess first-hand knowledge of the events surrounding 
the case they decide.  First-hand accounts, however, provide valuable 
insight into the facts and circumstances of a disputed situation.  Lay 
witnesses, therefore, play the vital role of explaining their own first-hand 
knowledge,265 in hopes of providing the jury with as realistic a re-creation 
of the events as possible.266  Despite the clear value of lay opinion 
testimony, however, our legal system, through the adoption of Rule 701, 
has demanded limits to such testimony.267 
This part discusses the flaws and merits of the circuit courts’ approaches 
to limiting law enforcement officers’ lay opinion testimony and analyzes 
the extent to which each approach to Rule 701 aligns with the Rule’s 
objective as stated in the Advisory Committee note.  The Advisory 
Committee note explains that the Rule is intended to help “put[] the trier of 
fact in possession of an accurate reproduction of the event.”268  This 
objective, along with the remainder of the Rule’s Advisory Committee note, 
should be closely followed.269 
Parts III.A and III.B highlight the errors in the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits’ approaches, arguing that the lay opinion holdings of 
these circuits should not be followed.  Part III.A explains that, by reading 
Rule 701 to include law enforcement officers who complete only after-the-
fact reviews, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have undermined the 
objective of the Rule and opened the door for prejudicial testimony.  Part 
III.B underscores that the approaches of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
similarly run counter to Rule 701’s Advisory Committee note, despite 
appearing to require greater first-hand knowledge.  While the law 
enforcement officers in these circuits may need to possess related first-hand 
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knowledge, in the end, their knowledge of the event in question is still after-
the-fact and is therefore insufficient to satisfy Rule 701.  Finally, Part III.C 
emphasizes the merits of the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits’ 
approaches to Rule 701, explaining why an amended version of these 
courts’ analyses should be followed.  These circuits limit law enforcement 
testimony under Rule 701 in a manner that serves the Rule’s true purpose 
and helps prevent the jury from hearing unqualified, unhelpful testimony. 
A.  The Problem of Overadmitting Lay Opinion Testimony 
in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have permitted law enforcement officers 
to provide lay opinion testimony even where the officer possesses only 
after-the-fact knowledge of the specific event in question.270  Admittance of 
such testimony constitutes a very broad interpretation of Rule 701(a)’s 
personal perception requirement271 and Rule 701(b)’s helpfulness 
requirement.272  Such a reading of Rule 701 results in an overly inclusive 
lay opinion rule.  More specifically, the approaches of the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits wrongly ignore the preference for providing the jury with 
facts over opinions whenever possible,273 thereby admitting lay opinion that 
unreasonably extends the reach of Rule 701, threatens the province of the 
jury, and provides an unfair advantage to the prosecution.  Accordingly, the 
approaches of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits conflict with the purpose of 
Rule 701 and should not be followed. 
As explained in Part II.A.1, in Jayyousi a law enforcement officer 
testified as a lay witness after having preformed only an after-the-fact 
review of the investigation materials.274  Addressing Rule 701(a) first, the 
court in Jayyousi explained that the Eleventh Circuit had never required a 
lay person testifying about allegedly coded language to participate in or 
observe the conversation in question.275  The court extended this assertion 
further, stating that lay witnesses do not need to be involved in events to 
testify about them.276  Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit in Zepeda-Lopez 
wholly ignored the Rule 701(a) issue, despite the appellant’s argument that 
the testifying agent did not have the requisite personal knowledge to 
support his visual and audio identifications.277  Concluding that the lower 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the agent’s lay opinion 
testimony,278 the Tenth Circuit found no error in the agent basing his lay 
opinion testimony on nothing more than his after-the-fact review of the 
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same videotape and recorded phone calls that were submitted into 
evidence.279 
The Advisory Committee note for Rule 701 states that a “witness’s 
perception” means the witness’s “first-hand knowledge or observation.”280  
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits did not suggest in either Jayyousi or 
Zepeda-Lopez that the testifying agent actually observed the incident in 
question.  Accordingly, these circuits must believe that an after-the-fact 
review of investigation materials meets the definition of first-hand 
knowledge.281 
Based on this interpretation, it appears that, in the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits, any investigating officer is qualified to offer lay opinion testimony 
if he merely reviews materials that pertain to the investigation.  An 
interpretation with this result wholly ignores the reason for requiring first-
hand knowledge for lay opinion testimony, which is to ensure that only 
individuals who actually perceived an incident are permitted to give 
opinions about it.282  As the dissent in Jayyousi explained, witnesses should 
not provide lay opinion testimony unless they “personally experienced an 
event and therefore have the ability to describe their layperson’s perception 
of the event that the jury cannot otherwise experience for itself.”283  
Individuals who personally perceived an event are uniquely qualified to 
offer lay opinion because they possess “sensory and experiential 
observations” otherwise unavailable to the jury.284  The dissent’s statement 
points to one of the essential elements that sets a lay witness apart from a 
jury member:  a first-hand knowledge of what occurred, which cannot be 
replicated by simply reviewing the documents in evidence.285 
More specifically, a law enforcement officer such as Agent Kavanaugh in 
Jayyousi or Agent Barrett in Zepeda-Lopez does not possess information 
that will increase the accuracy of a jury’s understanding because simply 
reviewing documents is essentially the same task that is given to the jury.  
That the witness has also reviewed the evidence and can offer his or her 
own opinion about its significance does not mean that the witness has first-
hand knowledge of the events any more than the jury has first-hand 
knowledge. 
The court in Jayyousi attempted to counter the argument that the agent’s 
testimony simply summarized admitted evidence by explaining that the 
agent reviewed thousands of documents, including those that were not 
submitted into evidence.286  However, as the dissent in Jayyousi argued, 
and as this Note contends, general knowledge of an investigation does not 
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provide a sufficient basis to offer a lay opinion regarding the specific events 
of an investigation.287  To hold otherwise undermines Rule 701 testimony.  
Indeed, lay testimony based on reviewing documents in evidence does not 
fall within any of the commonly accepted forms of a “witness’s perception” 
explained in Part I.C.1. 
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ approaches to law enforcement lay 
opinion testimony also provide an unfair tool for the prosecution.  As 
contended above, by effectively eliminating the first-hand knowledge 
requirement of Rule 701, it appears that a law enforcement officer need 
only review an investigation’s case file to then offer opinion testimony 
about the case.  Providing the prosecution with this type of tool unfairly 
advantages the government, as the defendant is unlikely to be able to 
produce a similarly situated law enforcement officer to testify to an 
alternative interpretation of the investigation. 
When examined under Rule 701(b)’s helpfulness requirement, the flaws 
of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ analyses are further demonstrated.  In 
Jayyousi the court argued that Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony was helpful 
because the agent was able to interpret the conversation within the wider 
context of the investigation as a whole.288  Employing a similar argument in 
Zepeda-Lopez, the Tenth Circuit found that Agent Barrett’s opinion 
testimony was helpful because he had the opportunity to review the 
videotape and audiotapes several times.289 
While Rule 701 testimony is not wholly limited to “necessary” 
testimony,290 it is limited to testimony that increases the accuracy of the 
jury’s understanding.291  Both courts, however, improperly defined 
“helpfulness” under Rule 701(b).  Neither Agent Kavanaugh in Jayyousi 
nor Agent Barrett in Zepeda-Lopez was helpful under Rule 701(b) because 
the jury was as capable as the witness to determine the significance of the 
evidence in question.292  Accordingly, such witness testimony is in direct 
conflict with Rule 701’s Advisory Committee note, which states that 
testimony should be deemed inadmissible if it “amount[s] to little more than 
choosing up sides.”293  The dissent in Jayyousi supported this assertion, 
finding that because the testimony in question was about facts already 
before the jury, the witness did nothing more than state the prosecution’s 
understanding of the facts.294  Where sufficient facts exist for a jury to 
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make its decision, wholly unnecessary lay opinions should not be 
admitted.295 
Finally, the approaches of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits should not be 
followed because they allow lay opinion testimony that threatens to invade 
the province of the jury.  While some scholars have rejected the argument 
that lay opinion testimony will usurp the function of the jury,296 this 
concern deserves greater attention,297 particularly where the witness in 
question is a law enforcement officer providing opinions based on an after-
the-fact review of the investigation.  When a law enforcement officer did 
not actually participate in or observe the situation, prosecutors may present 
the officer’s general knowledge of the case or professional experience as 
the basis for his opinion.298  In many ways, this framing dresses up a lay 
witness in an expert witness’s clothes, suggesting that the witness has such 
substantial knowledge of the case that he is qualified to testify about an 
aspect of which he was not involved.299  This form of testimony threatens to 
invade the province of a jury in the same way that some have argued expert 
testimony does.300  Analogizing authoritative lay witnesses with expert 
witness, jurors may, whether consciously or unconsciously, accept 
authoritative lay witnesses’ opinions without performing a proper, 
independent assessment of the evidence.301  Accordingly, special care 
should be paid to the decision to admit law enforcement officers’ lay 
opinion testimony, a care that the approaches of the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits do not demonstrate. 
The approaches of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits should be disregarded 
in light of their overly broad interpretations of Rule 701(a) and Rule 701(b). 
B.  Continuing Problems of an Overly Inclusive Lay Opinion Rule Found 
Under the Moderate Interpretation of Rule 701 
While the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, at first, appear to correct the 
problems of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits regarding the personal 
perception requirement of Rule 701(a), closer examination reveals that 
these circuits continue to embrace interpretations of Rule 701(a) that run 
counter to the Rule’s purpose and, thus, should not be followed. 
Both Freeman and Rollins involved officers testifying regarding the 
meaning of recorded phone calls.302  In both cases, just as in Jayyousi and 
Zepeda-Lopez, the testifying officer did not actually observe or participate 
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in the recorded conversation in question.303  Accordingly, in relation to the 
specific events about which the officers testified, the witnesses in Freeman 
and Rollins possessed no more first-hand knowledge or experience than the 
officers in Jayyousi and Zepeda-Lopez and were therefore no closer to 
having personally perceived the event.  However, unlike Jayyousi and 
Zepeda-Lopez, the officers in Freeman and Rollins did obtain first-hand 
knowledge subsequent to hearing the recordings, which helped inform their 
understandings of the conversations’ meanings.304  This subsequent 
knowledge included conducting surveillance305 and interviewing persons of 
interest.306  Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits offered this subsequent 
first-hand knowledge as further evidence that the officer was qualified 
under Rule 701(a) to provide testimony about the meaning of the recorded 
calls.307 
Under a proper reading of Rule 701, however, this form of first-hand 
knowledge does not enhance an officer’s qualification to testify because it 
does not increase the officer’s first-hand perception of the conversation 
itself.  To provide lay opinion testimony about a specific aspect of an 
investigation, courts should require an officer to have personally perceived 
the subject of the testimony.308  Merely possessing related information that 
influences the officer’s understanding of the event is not sufficient.  
Examining an analogous set of facts, the Fourth Circuit in Johnson 
explained that interviews with suspects were only second-hand information 
in reference to the meaning of the recorded calls in question.309  In other 
words, the only possible source of first-hand knowledge regarding an event 
is personal perception of the event itself.  Lay opinion testimony based on 
any other information constitutes nothing more than “post-hoc 
assessments.”310 
If the Rule was otherwise, as the approaches of the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits encourage, the lay opinion rule would remain overly broad and 
result in the same negative consequences outlined in Part III.A.  This is 
because none of the personal perception problems explained above would 
be solved.  An individual who did not personally perceive an event would 
still be testifying to its significance. 
Moreover, the officers in Freeman and Rollins would likely be able to 
provide lay opinion testimony about the interviews and surveillance—
independent from interpreting the recorded conversations—because they 
personally perceived the interviews and surveillance, as Rule 701 requires.  
It would then be for the jury to decide whether the combination of these 
pieces of evidence—the recorded calls, the surveillance, and the 
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interviews—constituted evidence of criminal activity.  Additionally, the 
prosecution could use both the opening and closing statements to argue the 
connection between these pieces of evidence.311  Moving away from the 
approaches of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, therefore, would not deprive 
the jury of any necessary information and would prevent a detrimental 
reading of Rule 701. 
C.  Creating Meaningful Limitations for Law Enforcement 
Lay Opinion Testimony Under Rule 701 
Departing from the overly inclusive approaches of the Seventh, Ninth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the approaches of the Second, Fourth, and 
Eighth Circuits provide valuable guidance for the proper interpretation of 
Rule 701(a) and 701(b), maintaining a focus on the Rule’s objective, as 
well as the other principles outlined in the Advisory Committee note.312  
First, this Note recommends that courts embrace an augmented version of 
the Rule 701(a) test for first-hand knowledge outlined in Peoples,313 which 
will align with the dissenting opinion in Jayyousi.314  Second, this Note 
supports an approach to Rule 701(b) that follows the Garcia court’s 
analysis. 
Peoples, Garcia, and Johnson each promote interpretations of Rule 
701(a) that help solve the problems associated with an overly inclusive lay 
opinion rule as outlined in Part III.A and Part III.B.  Most importantly, 
these circuits embrace a definition of first-hand knowledge that recognizes 
the purpose behind the personal perception requirement of Rule 701(a)315 
and ensures that only those who are properly qualified offer lay opinions.  
To begin, in Garcia the court emphasized that Agent Klemick did not have 
first-hand knowledge of the recorded calls in question because his opinion 
was based not on his personal perceptions but on the “total information 
developed by all the officials who participated in the investigation.”316  The 
court concluded that this did not serve Rule 701’s objective of providing a 
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more “‘accurate reproduction of the event’”317 because it offered no 
“unique insights of an eyewitness’s personal perceptions.”318  Johnson took 
a similar stance, finding testimony based on purely after-the-fact 
investigation to be “post-hoc assessments.”319 
With the fundamental concepts from Garcia and Johnson in mind, this 
Note turns to Peoples to provide a more concrete test for when law 
enforcement testimony meets the requirements of Rule 701(a).  In Peoples, 
a case that had substantially the same facts as Jayyousi,320 the Eighth 
Circuit found an officer’s lay opinion testimony to be inadmissible because 
she did not personally perceive the recorded conversations in question.321  
The court concluded that such testimony amounted to no more than a 
“narrative gloss” of the facts of the case.322  The court then outlined the 
three specific instances when a law enforcement officer may testify about 
the meaning of a recorded conversation.323  The list is as follows:  “when 
the law enforcement officer is a participant in the conversation, has personal 
knowledge of the facts being related in the conversation, or observed the 
conversations as they occurred.”324 
While the first and third prongs of this test are self-explanatory, the 
meaning of the second prong is somewhat less apparent.  To clarify, the 
second prong is not satisfied when a law enforcement officer obtains 
knowledge regarding the conversation subsequent to hearing the 
conversation, such as in the Seventh and Ninth Circuit cases.325  Instead this 
prong refers to individuals who possess personal knowledge of the 
conversation’s content because of past experiences with the subject at 
issue.326  In Peoples, the court cited United States v. Saulter,327 a case 
where a former drug dealer who had personal knowledge of the drug 
conspiracy discussed in the recorded calls was permitted to provide opinion 
testimony about the call’s meaning.328  The Fourth Circuit in Johnson 
further confirmed this conception of the second prong.329  Analogizing its 
facts to the facts in Peoples, Johnson explicitly found that information 
gathered subsequent to hearing a recorded call was insufficient to qualify a 
law enforcement officer to give lay opinion testimony about the 
conversation’s meaning.330 
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While the second prong differs somewhat from the test seen in the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits, this Note argues that, realistically, it poses 
substantially the same threats to the integrity of the testimony before the 
jury.  Alternatively, the dissent in Jayyousi contended that the requirement 
of first-hand knowledge is only satisfied where the law enforcement officer 
was “either (1) a personal participant in a conversation as an undercover 
agent, or (2) a listener to a conversation while observing a defendants’ 
behavior in real time to coordinate the conversation with the conduct.”331  
This more limited test accounts for the potential problems that the second 
prong would create and, in the end, does not prevent any necessary 
testimony from being admitted.332 
The two categories outlined in Peoples, and reiterated in the Jayyousi 
dissent, should be extended to all law enforcement officer testimony 
because they are broad enough to encompass all scenarios when an officer 
would properly offer lay opinion testimony, while narrow enough to help 
exclude testimony that is not actually based on first-hand knowledge.  
Accordingly, confining law enforcement lay opinion testimony will help 
solve the various problems associated with lay officer testimony.  First, the 
two distinct categories help ensure that testimony does not, as the court in 
Garcia explained, “dr[a]w on the total information developed by all the 
officials who participated in the investigation.”333  Officers will need to 
point to a specific experience in which they personally perceived the event 
in question.  Second, the categories prevent parties from disguising 
testimony based on specialized knowledge, which should be certified under 
Rule 702,334 as testimony based on the general knowledge of an 
investigation.  Because under this approach general knowledge will not be a 
sufficient basis for lay opinion testimony, officers again will need to show 
more specific first-hand knowledge to testify as a layperson.  As a whole, 
the categories will help to guarantee that only those who possess specific, 
identifiable first-hand knowledge of an event are allowed to offer testimony 
about its significance, resulting in fairer trials with less prejudicial 
testimony. 
Further, the interpretation of Rule 701(b) outlined in Garcia should be 
the controlling interpretation.  Most importantly, the Second Circuit in 
Garcia explains that lay opinion testimony cannot simply summarize 
admitted testimony.335  While Rule 701’s Advisory Committee note already 
supports this point,336 the principle must be adhered to more strictly, as 
done in Garcia.  If complete evidence is already before the jury, an officer 
must not be permitted to unnecessarily offer opinions, which do little more 
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than unduly influence the jurors to agree with the prosecution’s case.337  A 
complete bar on this form of testimony should be executed. 
In an effort to avoid usurping the jury’s duties and to maintain the fairest 
possible trial, all circuits should embrace the Second, Fourth, and Eighth 
Circuits’ approaches to Rule 701. 
CONCLUSION 
As the influence of the common law has waned, the role of lay opinion 
testimony in the American court system has significantly increased.338  
Generally, this change has been positive, responding to the obvious 
problems that a strict fact-opinion distinction created.339  Indeed, lay 
opinion testimony provides the jury with a clearer understanding of what 
occurred in a given situation and, therefore, helps the jury properly 
determine disputed facts.340  However, the existence of Rule 701 in and of 
itself demonstrates that lay opinion testimony must have a limit of some 
kind.  Because of Rule 701’s fairly vague wording, judges possess great 
discretion to determine the admissibility of lay testimony that lies within the 
Rule’s gray areas.341  In each situation, judges must determine whether the 
lay witness possesses sufficient “perception” of the situation, as well as 
whether the testimony is “helpful” to the trier of fact.342 
However, the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have strayed 
too far from the original meaning and purpose of Rule 701.  Their 
approaches have allowed unqualified and unnecessary testimony from law 
enforcement officers to reach jurors.  At least where officer testimony is at 
issue, the approaches of these four circuits need to be abandoned, and an 
augmented version of the approaches of the Second, Fourth, and Eighth 
Circuits should be embraced.  These three circuits have placed meaningful 
limitations on officers’ lay opinion testimony, generally striking the 
appropriate balance between allowing the jury to hear testimony and 
preventing witnesses from usurping the jury’s function. 
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